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The Road to Justice Revisited:  




In this article1 I review three major trends that pose fundamental questions for 
legal actors and observers concerned about the future context, governance and 
methodology of ethical legal work: first, why is the increasingly global move-
ment toward the ethicisation of law and legal work – which I see as the latest 
wave in the late Professor Cappelletti’s ‘Access to Justice Movement’ – taking 
place now?2 Second, what are the current reforms taking place across and 
beyond Europe, and within both civil law and common law jurisdictions, that 
seek to strengthen – and alter the balance between – the external regulation and 
internal education of lawyers’ professional conduct? And third, how is the trend 
within legal education and scholarship toward incorporating ethical perspec-
tives in academic (including socio-legal) and professional legal training evolv-
ing? In analysing these three converging trends and the novel ethical challenges 
they present to both legal practitioners and scholars I shall argue that our 
traditional positivistic tools are not so much defective, but rather inadequate, if 
we are to assume greater responsibility for understanding and influencing the 
formation of professional character within the legal sphere. Furthermore, I shall 
argue that the failure of both academic and professional associations to recog-
nise and deal effectively with ethics has resulted, in part, in the current on-
slaught on professional status and the incapacity to defend legal markets against 
intrusion by the state and other professions. Legal professions are under siege: 
the market for legal services is increasingly competitive and subject to external 
threats and internal dissension and, above all, the capacity of legal professions 
to self-regulate – the traditional badge used to define and defend professional 
status – has almost everywhere been called into question, if not removed, as 
lawyers are forced to explain the declining scope, cost and quality of the 
services they offer.  
                                                           
1  Edited version of keynote address delivered to the Dutch (& Flemish) Law and 
Society Association (VSR - Vereniging voor de Sociaal-wetenschappelijke bestu-
dering van het Recht: http://www.ru.nl/vsr/ at the Conferentiecentrum Bovendonk te 
Hoeven on 8 December 2005. 
2  M. Cappelletti & B. Garth (eds.) Access to Justice. (Milan/Alphen aan den rijn: 
Giuffrè/Sijthoff and Noordhoff, 1978-1979). See also M. Storme & F. Carpi (eds.), 
In Honorem Mauro Cappelletti (1927-2004). Tribute to an International Procedural 
Lawyer (The Hague: Kluwer International, 2005). 
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 These trends also present novel challenges for the socio-legal scholar: not 
only do we need to describe and map the evolving behaviour of lawyers – to 
examine, as we have always done, the various interactions between law, the 
legal profession and society – but we must now also seek to get under the skin 
of lawyers and to explore and explain the unfamiliar terrain of the internal 
world of law. Whether, as legal scholars, we should venture further still and 
actually seek to influence legal behaviour by consciously pushing it in an 
ethical direction is a question to which I shall return. In any event, we need to 
draw upon psychological and philosophical insights in order to see more clearly 
the boundaries of human experience within legal professionalism by engaging 
with a variety of disciplines that cross the humanities and social sciences. What 
moves and motivates lawyers to carry out ‘good work’ and pursue justice as 
opposed to profit? Can justice be taught? If so, when and where should it be 
introduced in the educational continuum? We can only answer such questions if 
we embrace and seriously engage with educational, psychological and ethical 
theory. I shall argue in favour of ethical positivism in socio-legal studies and 
the need to create what I shall call a new brand of ‘ethico-legal’ studies 
grounded in critical empiricism yet also sensitive to normative theory.3 In short, 
not only must we map the road to justice; we need also to travel along it our-
selves so that we move toward, if not experience, this elusive ideal.  
 
2. Lawyers’ Access to Justice – A Fourth Wave in the Global Access to 
Justice Movement? 
 
A decade ago the under the chairmanship of Professor Franken – then Dean of 
the Leiden Law Faculty – a national investigation into the future of Dutch legal 
research was launched. The Franken Report noted common trends in both 
Dutch and international legal scholarship toward socio-legal research but also, 
significantly, sought to make positive recommendations including pleading for 
stronger links with the social sciences and humanities and greater use of com-
parative and ethical perspectives in legal analysis. The report was prescient and, 
for present purposes, it is worth remembering what the Franken Committee 
proposed on the topic of ethics: 
 
“We plead for strong intellectual ties with ethics. Law faculties must deliver consci-
entious lawyers, not simple implementation officers. A lawyer must be constantly 
aware of the ethical content of his decisions. Especially attorneys and corporate la-
wyers, sometimes out of necessity for partiality, move on the boundaries of what is 
ethically allowed. Lawyers are to an increasing extent confronted with politico-legal 
considerations. The developments of the private professional sense of values is nec-
                                                           
3  See D. Trubek,‘Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism’ (1984) 
36 Stanford L. Rev. 575. See also the discussion of Brian Tamanaha linking behav-
iourism and interpretivism in socio-legal studies: B.Z. Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-
Legal Theory. Pragmatism and a Social Theory of Law (Oxford: OUP,1997) ch.3. 
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essary for a socially responsible professional practice...Because numerous ethical, 
philosophical and political questions are submitted to the law nowadays, the search 
for normative starting points for the law to deal with such complex and controversial 
social issues gets much greater urgency. What does a lawyer base his principles and 
fair judgements on when he is asked to weigh the visions of parties concerned that 




Today it is not clear whether this call has been heard adequately in the Nether-
lands and whether sufficient progress has been made in embedding ‘a sense of 
direction’ within the Dutch legal profession. Since then several other countries 
have accepted the challenge of exploring the ethical dimension in legal educa-
tion and conduct and today most jurisdictions agree that ethical awareness, if 
not sophistication, amongst lawyers matters. But there remains doubt and 
confusion over just how prescriptive one should be with regard to instilling 
ethics throughout the legal profession and what exactly legal educators and 
scholars should be doing to imbibe legal values in the minds – if not souls – of 
future lawyers. Evangelical lawyers may not be trusted but there is also a sense 
amongst many that we are growing tired of the ubiquitous cynicism within and 
toward the legal profession. 
 While there may be superficial agreement on the broad ethical aims toward 
which lawyers’ actions should be directed (normally this means conformity to 
minimal standards set out in the code of professional conduct)5 there is no clear 
consensus on whether or how lawyers should tread the path to justice. It may be 
possible to establish a negative consensus around where the profession should 
not to go – the dubious places and corrupt activities that are to be avoided if the 
profession is to maintain its professional status and discipline (though even here 
there will be disputes around the edges) – but not so easy to agree a single 
positive way forward to enlightened, humane legal practice. Indeed, lawyers 
today appear increasingly confused about their professional role if not detached 
                                                           
4  H. Franken, Een eigen richting voor het recht...Eindrapport van de Verkennings-
commissie Rechtsgeleerdheid. (A sense of direction...The future of legal research in 
the Netherlands). Final Report of the Legal Education Review Commission, 1997, 
pp.55-56. See also reviews of legal education in other jurisdictions:: ACLEC, First 
report on legal education and training, (London,1996) para 1.19-20. Considered in 
B. Hepple, ‘The renewal of the liberal law degree’ (1996) 55Cambridge L.J. 
470,484; H.W.Arthurs,’Half a league onward: The report of the Lord Chancellor’s 
Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct’ (1997)31 The Law Teacher 
1; J. Webb,’ Ethics for lawyers or ethics for citizens? New directions for legal edu-
cation.’ (1998) 25 J. Law and Society 134. R. MacCrate, Legal Education and Pro-
fessional Development - An Educational Continuum. Report of the Task Force on 
Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap. (Chicago, 1992); D. Pearce, 
Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the Commonwealth Tertiary 
Commission (Australian,1987); W.B.Cotter, Professional Responsibility Instruction 
in Canada: A Coordinated Curriculum for Legal Education (Montreal, 1992); 
5  See D. Nicolson ‘Making Lawyers Moral? Ethical Codes and Moral Character’ 
(2005) 25 Legal Studies 601 
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from their moral foundations – lost in some moral maze rather than steadily 
trekking toward utopian justice – and it is precisely this lack of orientation that 
prompted the former Dean of Yale Law School, Anthony Kronman, to write an 
influential work on the American legal profession called, tellingly, The Lost 
Lawyer.6 If the road to law also leads to justice that for many modern lawyers 
may be purely accidental, for most of the time they appear to pursue economic 
goals that are some distance, if not totally divorced from, from justice.  
 I have chosen as my title “The Road to Justice Revisited” in part because I 
wish to pay tribute to the pioneering empirical study of access to law and legal 
services carried out thirty years ago in the mid 1970s by Schuyt, Groenendijk 
and Sloot in The Road to Justice.7 This Dutch study, despite not being fully 
translated into English, was nevertheless highly influential outside the Nether-
lands and set new rigorous standards in empirical socio-legal research and, in 
my own case, helped forge original interdisciplinary links with geographical 
research.8 This research also drew upon practical experiments with proactive 
legal services including mobile legal services and it is worth noting that today 
the road to justice takes place over both land and water.9 Moreover, distin-
guished UK socio-legal scholars have recently conducted wide-ranging empiri-
                                                           
6  A.T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (Cam-
bridge: Belknap,1993); M.A. Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the crisis in 
the Profession Is Transforming American Society (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 
1994. See also: S.M. Linowitz, The Betrayed Profession, Lawyering at the End of 
the Twentieth Century (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press,1994); R. Nelson, et al, 
Lawyers’ Ideals/Lawyers’ Practices: Transformations in the American Legal Pro-
fession (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1992). 
7  K. Schuyt et al., De weg naar het recht “The road to law” (Deventer, 
Kluwer, 1976; english version: European Yearbook in Law And Sociology 
(1977) p.111.) For a review of the international ‘legal needs’ literature see: 
K. Economides, “2002: A Justice Odyssey” 34:1 Victoria University of Wel-
lington Law Review 1 (2003). 
8  K. Economides, “Law and Geography: New Frontiers” in Legal Frontiers ed. 
P.A.Thomas in Applied Legal Philosophy Series gen.ed. T.Campbell, Dart-
mouth,1996, pp.180-207. See also: Access to Justice in Rural Britain Project 
(AJRBP): ESRC-funded project: 1984-87: E00232054. See Blacksell, Economides 
& Watkins, Justice Outside the City, (Harlow, Longman, 1991); reviewed by Jon T. 
Johnsen, "Rural Justice: Country Lawyers and Legal Services in the United States 
and Britain", Law & Social Inquiry Vol.17: 3, 1992, 415-436. This project devel-
oped out of an attempt to set up a rural law centre (rechtwinkel) based in Exeter, see 
further: K. Economides, "Legal Services and Rural Deprivation", Bracton Law 
Journal, Vol.15, 1982, pp.41-78. Economides & Blacksell, ”Access to Justice in 
Rural Britain: Final Report” 16 Anglo-American Law Rev. 353 (1987). 
9  See the discussion of the Norwegian ‘juss-buss’ by C.A. Groenendijk, “Juss-Buss: 
Alternatieve en aktieve rechtshulp” in Rechtshulp een bewijs van onvermogen, 
March 1974. pp.72-84. This model has been adapted elsewhere: see K.Economides, 
‘Devon Law Bus’ Legal Action, May 2003, pp 9-10. See also the delivery of legal 
services on the Amazon: S. Blore, ‘Justice in a water world: the law of the Amazon 
jungle’ The Independent 25 January 2006. 
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cal national studies of the Paths to Justice used by the British public – the 
demand side of the access equation – that further the approach first developed 
by Schuyt et al.10 What links all of these studies is the desire to map the physi-
cal access citizens have with the justice system. 
 Interestingly, twenty years earlier Lord Denning (or Sir Alfred Denning as 
he then was) published a series of lectures in 1955 also called The Road to 
Justice.11 His approach was however very different and although perhaps 
moving in the same overall direction, and sharing a rejection of narrow black-
letter law, he took a very different path to justice – it is tempting to describe 
these paths as being a ‘high’ road and a ‘low’ road to justice. Schuyt’s route 
was positivistic and sociologically sophisticated whilst Denning’s was unasha-
medly normative and bordered on being morally naïve.12 Instead of discovering 
and mapping the various pathways that lead citizens to and within the legal 
system Denning concentrated on inviting lawyers – but also judges – to connect 
with the justice that lay beyond legality as expressed in formal rules (though he 
also appreciated the great practical importance of accessible legal services and 
independent legal institutions): 
 
“May I ask you in your own progress in the law, not to rely over much on legality – 
on the technical rules of law – but ever to seek those things which are right and true; 
for there alone will you find the road to justice. When you set out on this road you 
must remember that there are two great objects to be achieved: one is to see that the 
laws are just: the other that they are justly administered. Both are important; but of 
the two, the more important is that the law should be justly administered. It is no use 
having just laws if theyare administered unfairly by bad judges or corrupt lawyers. A 
country can put up with laws that are harsh or unjust so long as they are administe-
red by just judges who can mitigate their harshness or alleviate their unfairness: but 




Denning’s lectures are more of a sermon in which he preaches on (and especial-
ly to) the ‘just judge’ and the ‘honest lawyer’ whilst calling upon the need for a 
‘free press ‘and ‘eternal vigilance’ in relation to fundamental freedoms. There 
is wisdom and foresight in his preaching and he was ahead of his time in his 
concern with character and what might be described as virtue ethics in legal 
practice. The particular virtues he extols are command of language, courage 
                                                           
10  H. Genn, Paths to Justice: What People Do and Think about Going to Law (Oxford, 
Hart, 1999); H.Genn and A. Paterson, Paths to Justice Scotland: What People in 
Scotland Do and Think About Going to Law (Oxford, Hart, 2001). 
11  A. Denning,The Road to Justice (London, Stevens,1955). 
12  Denning was also sociologically naïve though ,by concentrating more on the supply 
side of the access equation, he anticipated what later became known as the ‘social 
organisation theory.’ See L. Mayhew & A.J. Reiss,”The social organisation of legal 
contacts” (1969) 34 American Soc.Rev. 309; L. Mayhew, ”Institutions of legal rep-
resentation: civil justice and the public” (1975) 9 Law & Society Rev. 401. 
13  Id. pp.6-7. 
8  Kim Economides 
and courtesy.14 What links both Denning and Schuyt is a deep and genuine 
concern to explain and understand legal behaviour: but whereas Schuyt and his 
associates sought to describe accurately and objectively, from an external 
scientific standpoint, how, when and where lawyers function in the legal 
process; Denning, from an internal standpoint, looked at legal conduct from 
inside the soul of the professional lawyer and ultimately sought justice there.15  
 Based on a review of international experience in the developing field of 
legal ethics I want to open up the possibility of constructing a novel synthesis 
that combines the best of both of these approaches, perhaps building upon the 
earlier work of Nonet and Selznick calling for a jurisprudential sociology 
supporting responsive (or purposive) law informed by moral and policy pre-
cepts.16 But before attempting this we need to understand the forces that cur-
rently are moving lawyers deeper in the direction of ethics and away from their 
traditional and safe territory: the deontology of amoral, neutral partisanship. 
 The motivation to understand legal behaviour – both scientifically and 
emotionally – has been steadily growing over the past decade and today there is 
widespread interest in both the external and internal pressures pressing lawyers 
to look more carefully at ethics. But we need to ask why is this re-discovery 
taking place now and what lies behind it. The reasons for this universal trend 
are complex but, whatever the local conditions in any given jurisdiction, the 
call for increased ethical awareness carries favour because it may address, or 
redress, a perceived decline in respect for professional values. And professional 
values – as a form of cultural capital – matter for economic and other reasons. 
But it would be wrong to look at this issue only from the standpoint of the legal 
profession as both government and consumers of legal services also have a 
stake in ensuring that professional values are defended and survive the on-
slaught of commercial values. Professions everywhere are struggling to define 
their mission and understand their place in a changing society, asking themsel-
ves whether they remain a profession or, if the truth be told, whether in fact 
they are nothing more than a business. In the UK provincial and rural lawyers 
                                                           
14  Cf. C. Parker, Just Lawyers. Regulation and Access to Justice (Oxford: OUP, 1999) 
at p.87 who identifies four interwoven ideals or traditions in lawyers’ ethical de-
bates, treatises and codes: 
 “ 1. The ideal of devoted service to clients in a legal system where citizens need 
advice and representation to use the legal system (the advocacy ideal). 
 2. The ideal of fidelity to law and justice if the system is not to be sabotaged by 
clients who will pay a lawyer to do anything (the social responsibility ideal). 
 3. An ideal of willingness to work for people or causes that are usually excluded 
from the legal system (the justice ideal). 
 4. The ideal of courtesy, collegiality, and mutual self-regulation amongst members 
of the profession (the ideal of collegiality).” 
15  Mayhew and Reiss perhaps expressed this perspective in sociological terms through 
their ‘social organization theory’ that concentrated on the supply side of legal serv-
ices: 
16  P. Nonet and P. Selznick, Law and Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1978). 
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still uphold and defend traditional values and these practices differ radically 
from those associated with global law firms based in London and other urban 
conurbations.17 Similar divisions exist in other European countries as everyw-
here the defence of professional and humane values becomes increasingly 
difficult in the face of commercial values, competition and the inexorable 
pressure to make profit in order to survive. Faced with these commercial 
realities we need to examine the (professional) role and responsibilities of legal 
scholars and law teachers in communicating understanding of ethics to the next 
generation of lawyers.  
 There are three separate audiences all interested in re-discovering ethics for 
the salvation of the modern lawyer. These audiences, which no doubt overlap, 
may be classified as: educational, managerial and consumerist. First, for legal 
educators, ethics addresses a failure of the modern lawyer to connect with – let 
alone defend – liberal professional values by redressing the limitations of a 
dogmatic, formalistic and positivistic legal education concentrating exclusively 
on communicating knowledge of legal rules rather than a deep understanding of 
legal values. Ethics could help lawyers prepare for an uncertain future and 
unpredictable situations where ‘rules run out’. Second, for those managing 
professional bar associations – or particular law firms – where there is a crisis 
of collegiality and professional identity rooted in the fragmentation and regu-
larisation of legal work and fuelled by the increasing use of technology, spe-
cialization and globalization. Ethics for this group may restore a collective 
sense of what it means to be a lawyer (and justify the right to charge higher 
fees), and regardless of where legal work is conducted. Ethics therefore sup-
ports professional ethos, and at many different levels (and it is no accident that 
both concepts share the same etymological root). Finally, for those concerned 
about declining standards of legal work, and public respect for lawyers – 
whether as regulators, managers or consumers of legal services – the ethical 
turn arguably supports both educational and regulatory strategies for supporting 
quality standards in legal work. It is tempting to see ethics as a kind of panacea 
capable of remedying all of the ills – moral or economic – afflicting the modern 
lawyer. The promise is that through promoting ethics and consciously travelling 
along the road to justice we shall also promote a more humane, prosperous, 
coherent and socially responsible professionalism, whilst at the same time 
dispelling increasing private doubts and public cynicism that undermine profes-
sional status and confidence. But will this promise be realised? 
 
3. International Regulation of Lawyers’ Ethical Conduct 
 
Having sketched the wider context that explains the background and motivation 
for the current move toward strengthening lawyers’ ethics we should now turn 
to questions of governance and how the legal profession, particularly within 
Europe, is responding to challenges to its right to self-regulation, a traditional 
                                                           
17  Economides, infra, n. 20. 
10  Kim Economides 
badge of independent, autonomous professions. Over the past 15 years there 
has been increasing state intervention in the market for legal services but also, 
beyond the state in the private sector, increasing managerialist tendencies that 
purport to define and regulate the so-called ‘quality’ of legal work.18 Legal 
professions have become ever more accountable and less able to rely on the 
mere assertion of professional power and authority. Consumers question this 
power and no longer automatically accept the cost, arcane language or accuracy 
of legal advice. Other professions, notably accountants, compete openly for 
traditional legal work, the boundaries of which are contested and ever chan-
ging. Lawyers have not only lost, as Abel claims, control over their markets; 
they have surrendered also ideological control over their destiny and, in the 
eyes of the public and perhaps themselves, suffered a loss of confidence and 
moral authority. Some sections of the profession have not been too worried by 
this corporatist trend that puts profit before principle and may even welcome 
becoming ever more oriented toward business19 – while other (normally ‘old 
style’ traditional or peripheral) lawyers express fears that genuine professional 
values are moribund.20 From a consumer standpoint perhaps these differing 
views are of little consequence if, through effective regulation or new tech-
nologies, standards and quality in legal work are maintained. If non-lawyers – 
or even machines – are capable of delivering accurate legal advice why bother 
with promoting legal ethics and humane professionalism? Indeed, for so long as 
high standards of competence in legal work are being delivered to citizens at 
reasonable cost, effectively policed by the professions and/or the state, one may 
well ask why any of us should be at all bothered by legal ethics and the need to 
travel the road to justice. Why not let lawyers, openly and honestly, travel the 
road to profit instead? 
 The pragmatic answer found in the majority of European countries would 
suggest that there is an increasing reliance on external regulation to maintain 
standards and a conscious assault on the professional power of lawyers who are 
no longer trusted. Whichever jurisdiction one turns to the statistics tell a similar 
story that highlight common trends: lawyers’ standards of conduct appear to be 
steadily declining whilst complaints against them are steadily increasing. Social 
advocacy, despite the current interest in pro bono work, is not as popular as it 
was in the 1970s. In the Netherlands and the UK legal aid offices and law shops 
                                                           
18  See D. Muzio and S. Ackroyd, “ On the Consequences of Defensive Professional-
ism: Recent Changes in the Legal Labour Process” 32 J. Law and Society 615 
(2005). 
19  Robert Gordon describes this as ‘libertarian antinomianism’, see: “A New Role for 
Lawyers: The Corporate Counselor after Enron” 35 Conn. L.Rev.1185 (2003). See 
also Jane Jacobs, Systems of Survival (New York, Vintage, 1992) for a discussion of 
the moral foundations of commerce and politics. 
20  K. Economides, "The Country Lawyer: Iconography, Iconoclasm and the Restora-
tion of the Professional Image" in Tomorrow's Lawyers ed. P.A. Thomas, Blackwell, 
Oxford (1992) and M. Blacksell, K. Economides, C. Watkins, "Country Solicitors: 
Their Professional Role in Rural Britain" Sociologia Ruralis Vol.25, 1987, pp.181-
196. 
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are in decline and, following the UK, there has been a recent review in the 
Netherlands into the desirability of the monopoly over rights of audience.21  
 Professional monopolies, restrictive practices and privileges have all come 
under siege and professional character itself attacked and often made the 
subject of ridicule.22 In England & Wales the Clementi Review has mounted a 
serious but not untypical challenge to professional self-regulation and restric-
tive practices.23 From January 2006, the professional practices of English and 
Welsh lawyers will come under close external scrutiny and all legal work will 
become far more accountable, far less mysterious and subject to the broad 
interests of the public and consumers and that ultimate modern value: efficien-
cy. But it is important to place this national trend in a wider European, if not, 
global, context. Four years ago there was an important conference held in 
Ghent supported inter alia by the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the 
European Union (CCBE) and the Union Internationale des Avocats (UIA) 
called “Towards a new ethical framework for a legal profession in transition.”24 
This meeting examined new structures of professional organisation such as 
multinational and Multi-Disciplinary Practices (MDPs) and their impact on 
ethics and evolving regulatory policy. But it also highlighted the fact that there 
was a common trend toward external regulation and concern about the internal 
ethics of the profession to which one response might be the development of 
common training, or at least a common ethical core, for transnational lawye-
ring.25 
                                                           
21  See, eg, N.J.H. Huls & Z.D. Lacle, Meer marktwerking binnen de advocatuur?, (Den 
Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2006) and the ongoing debate between the Dutch 
Minister of Justice and the Netherlands Bar Association: R. Parnham, “The 
Clementi Reforms in a European Context – are the proposals really that radical?” 
8:2 Legal Ethics (2005) p.195. 
22  M. Galanter, Lowering the Bar: Lawyer Jokes and Legal Culture (Wisconsin, Univ. 
of Wisc. Press, 2005). 
23  Sir David Clementi, Review of the Regulatory Framework for Legal Services in 
England and Wales. Final Report, London, 15 December 2004; www.legal-services-
review.org.uk/content/report/index.htm 
24  See K. Raes & B. Claessens (eds.) Towards a new Ethical Framework for a Legal 
Profession in Transition? Proceedings of the European conference on ethics and the 
legal profession, held at Ghent University (Belgium) on 25 and 26 October 2001 
Intersentia, Antwerp, 2002. See also: D. S. Clark, “Comparing the work and organi-
zation of Lawyers Worldwide: The Persistence of Legal Traditions” in J.J.Barceló 
III & R. C. Cramton (eds) Lawyers’ Practice & Ideals: A Comparative View (The 
Hague: Kluwer International, 1999) pp. 9-155. E. Godfrey (ed) Law Without Fron-
tiers.A Comparative Survey of the Rules of Professional Ethics Applicable to the 
Cross-Border Practice of Law (London: Kluwer Law International & International 
Bar Association, 1995). 
25  See A.Boon and J,Flood, ‘Globalization of Professional Ethics? The Significance of 
Lawyers International Codes of Conduct’2:1 Legal Ethics 29 (1999); H.Arthurs, ‘A 
Global Code of Legal Ethics for the Transnational Legal Field’ 2:1 Legal Ethics 195 
(1999). 
12  Kim Economides 
 For some time now European institutions have been exercising increasing 
control over professional conduct. European law has also been fuelling debates 
on ethics, both directly and indirectly, regarding the free movement of lawyers 
and the establishment of uniform standards of professionalism.26 Put simply, 
will the ethics of lawyers in one member state adequately support practice in 
another and who will guarantee that professional standards will not be com-
promised through the free movement of legal professionals, particularly in an 
expanded Europe? The Clementi Review in England & Wales should however 
be seen as part of a much wider European if not global trend giving outside 
bodies the power to regulate the delivery of legal services.  
 Beyond Europe there is one other trend worth noting that is known in the 
US as ‘entity regulation’.27 It neither focuses on the collective regulation of the 
legal profession through profession-wide codes of conduct, disciplinary rules 
etc nor, at the other extreme, does it rely on legal education to guide and influ-
ence an individual’s ethical conduct. Instead there is an attempt to re-direct and 
focus attention on the law firm, as a training establishment, offering an interes-
ting third way of tackling the problem of how to ensure the production of good 
legal work. There are strong parallels that may exist here between the family 
and the law firm, both of which may contribute to the incubation of professio-
nal values amongst lawyers. One of the major issues that should be addressed 
concerns how best to identify and articulate these values. Are there specific 
professional values unique to lawyers and legal work or are such values in fact 
shared with the other liberal professions?28 Socio-legal scholars are well equip-
ped to tackle such questions. 
 In this new regulatory climate where lawyers appear to be losing control to 
outside bodies at almost every level, legal ethics may be considered unimpor-
tant, even otiose. In other words effective regulation has apparently supplanted 
the need for the effective ethical education of lawyers and bad or defective 
lawyering will in future be managed through regulatory strategy designed to 
police and maintain standards of legal work. But the crucial question to ask 
here (and again it is one that the socio-legal community is ideally placed to 
answer) is whether in fact this regulation, however pervasive it may be, is in 
fact effective? 
 We should be cautious about what regulation will actually deliver and wise 
to lower our expectations. This regulatory strategy is unlikely to prove succes-
                                                           
26  See Directive 98/5/EC of 16 February 1998 and the ECJ Morgenbesser decision of 
13 November 2003, Christine Morgenbesser v Consiglio dell'Ordine degli avvocati 
di Genova Case (C-313/01) both of which facilitate the transfer of legal profession-
als through recognition of professional qualifications.  
27  See E. Chambliss, “MDPs: Toward an Institutional Strategy for Entity Regulation” 
4:1 Legal Ethics 45 (2001). 
28  K. Economides, “What are Fundamental Legal Values?” in K. Economides et al. 
(eds.), Fundamental Values. A Volume of Essays to Commemorate the 75th Anniver-
sary of the Founding of the Law School in Exeter 1923-1998. (Oxford, OUP, 2000) 
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sful in the long run if it is divorced from a parallel strategy directed at educa-
ting lawyers in professional values and ethics. First, lawyers are by virtue of 
their technical legal training perfectly adept at evading regulatory rules. There 
is an interesting body of socio-legal research (much of which is carried out in 
Rotterdam) that examines compliance and shows, for example in the fields of 
tax reform, organ donation and peak hour commuting how the regulated may 
often evade the aims of the regulator through ‘creative compliance’.29 Lawyers 
as a group are far better than most others at understanding rules, including of 
course those that purport to control or regulate their own conduct, and therefore 
can avoid or use rules for purposes other than those intended by regulators, 
judges or legislators. Second, the regulatory approach tends exclusively to 
focus on negative or dysfunctional behaviour. It seeks to outlaw conduct and 
practices that undermine professionalism yet will do little if anything to promo-
te positive behaviour that will support or instil ‘good lawyering’. The regula-
tory approach reinforces a pathological view of legal conduct and fails to offer 
positive models of good behaviour that motivate lawyers to become more 
ethical or professional. By focusing on superficial compliance with rules 
enshrined in codes designed to maintain ‘hygiene’ this approach almost assu-
mes (perhaps correctly) that modern lawyers are naturally prone to egregious 
behaviour. A third more practical problem is that regulatory machinery itself 
tends to be slow, ineffective, expensive and prone to capture and in reality 
presupposes the existence of ethical lawyers.  
 
4. Experimenting with Ethics in Legal Education 
 
If regulatory strategy by itself is unlikely to take us far along the road to justice 
can legal education take us very much further? We need next to examine what 
elsewhere has been described as the ‘fourth wave’ in the Access to Justice 
movement: ‘Lawyers’ Access to Justice’.30 Evidence of such a global move-
ment clearly exists and reaches far beyond the Netherlands, the UK or indeed 
Europe. There appears to be ‘a worldwide trend’ toward introducing or streng-
thening the place of ethics in the modern law curriculum in order to promote 
the goal of ‘good lawyering’. Several common law jurisdictions (eg New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada) – and not only the US following its Watergate 
scandal – have now introduced, or are about to introduce, ethics into their law 
                                                           
29  D. McBarnet, ‘After Enron: corporate governance, creative compliance and the uses 
of Corporate Social Responsibility’ in J. O'Brien (ed.) Governing the Corporation, 
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30  See Economides op cit n.7. 
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curricula.31 Recently I taught on a compulsory legal ethics course in New 
Zealand and have attended international conferences and seminars discussing 
the place of ethics in legal education.32 Similar debates are also under way in 
Latin America and Asia – in Japan, Hong Kong, the South Pacific, India, Korea 
and Taiwan – about the ethical dimension to modern legal education.33 It is 
interesting to note that very often it is the profession rather than academics that 
are the driving force behind this change. And, as already mentioned, ethics is 
also attracting increasing attention in the civil law systems throughout Europe 
and also at the transnational level of EU law.34 Although legal ethics are now 
coming of age it would be wrong to think that this topic has only recently been 
discovered; in fact it would be far more accurate to say that legal ethics has 
been ‘re-discovered’. But it is worth noting that this current re-discovery of 
ethics is taking place within and after the academy so that the road to justice is 
passing not only through the law school but also entering continual professional 
development at the post-vocational stage. More interesting still is the attempt in 
some jurisdictions to strengthen moral or civic education prior to and beyond 
law school: in the UK, for example, increasing emphasis is being placed on 
teaching ‘citizenship’ to school children and also discussions are under way as 
to how to develop new forms of public legal education. The logic of such 
developments is worth noting for the future of legal ethics: for if moral values 
are strongly rooted in society itself one could argue that there is no need for a 
specific legal ethics for the professional lawyer. 
 Many countries are experimenting with introducing ethics to future lawyers 
and citizens but also raising questions about the obligations the former owe to 
the latter. Traditional legal ethics has limited lawyers’ duties almost exclusively 
to clients – where lawyers’ have an almost absolute duty to serve their client’s 
                                                           
31  See K.Economides (ed.), Ethical Challenges to Legal Education & Conduct (Ox-
ford: Hart, 1998). D. Webb, ”Ethics as a Compulsory Element of Qualifying Law 
Degrees: Some Modest Expectations” (2002) 4:2 Legal Ethics 109-126 (on New 
Zealand); M. A. Noone and J. Dickson, “Teaching Towards a New Professionalism: 
Challenging Law Students to Become Ethical Lawyers” 4:2 Legal Ethics, 2002, 
127-145 (on Australia). On recent Canadian developments that incorporate an eco-
nomic perspective on legal ethics – or ‘ethinomics’ - see: R. Graham, Legal Ethics: 
Theories, Cases and Professional Regulation (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2004). 
32  See K. Economides and J. Webb, “Teaching Ethics and Professionalism: A Lesson 
from the Antipodes”, 4:2 Legal Ethics, 2002,.91-94. For accounts of international 
conferences see: S. Nelson, “Reflections from the International Conference on Legal 
Ethics from Exeter” (2004) 7 Legal Ethics 159-166; S. Brown, “A True Meeting of 
Minds: A Conference Report from Japan” (2005) 8:1 Legal Ethics 12.  
33  See chapters on South Pacific and Brazil in Economides id. See also: H. Kim, “In 
Search of the ‘Soul of Professionalism’: The Case of Legal Education Reform Ef-
forts in South Korea” (2002) 5 Legal Ethics, 27-33 (on South Korea); J. Gandhi 
(ed.) Power and Passion: Study of Socio-Ethical Concerns of the Lawyers (forth-
coming, Gyan Publishing, Delhi, 2006) (on India); and Su-Po Kao, “The Legal Pro-
fession as an Intermediary: A Framework on Lawyers in Society” (2004) 7:1 Legal 
Ethics 39-53 (on Taiwan). 
34  See K. Raes & B. Claessens , op cit.n.24. 
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interests – downplaying any obligations owed that may be owed to third parties, 
the Court or the wider public interest. Although we can see a consensus that 
ethics should be taught this is by no means universal nor is it clear how this 
should be achieved. Here in the Netherlands pioneering work by de Groot-van 
Leeuwen35 is particularly interesting in showing how law students and practiti-
oners differ as to how the same hypothetical ethical dilemmas should be resol-
ved, suggesting that the seasoned practitioner is not always correct when it 
comes to finding the fairest solution. As ethical legal education matures and a 
literature capable of supporting rigorous learning of the subject becomes better 
established we may begin to find solutions to persistent pedagogic problems of 
how to teach ethics.36 These difficulties do not negate the basic need to expose 
lawyers to ethics but at the same time they are sufficiently problematic in that 
they may have encouraged taking the easy path of too heavy reliance on regula-
tion.  
 The approach I wish to advance involves more than just communicating or 
even debating codes of professional conduct and the ‘off-the-peg” morality 
they contain. Let me try to highlight some of the challenges that arise in trying 
to promote deeper ethical awareness amongst lawyers through education. First, 
many lawyers and law students will resist – or even resent – ethical sermons. 
Many UK legal academics have now moved away from the strict positivistic 
view that separated law and morals for the past 200 years to arrive at a position 
today that says it is not so much what you think, but rather that you think about 
the ethical dimension to Law, including how you as an individual relate to your 
professional discipline. So the responsibility and role of the law teacher must be 
to present a range of options and approaches towards understanding (and 
practising) ethics in the law and to leave the student to decide which ethical 
path in law they intend to follow. It is more a case of handing down to subse-
quent generations an ethical map rather than insisting that any particular road to 
justice must be followed.  
 Lawyers universally assert that they are special, unique and that their work 
involves peculiar methods, values and practices that differ significantly from 
that of other professions. But I am not so sure. I suspect that the core underly-
ing values associated with Law may be very similar to many other liberal 
professions. If so, I think there is more ‘good work’ to be done by law schools 
in terms of inculcating and truly educating the next generation in those funda-
mental values, and I prefer the term ‘values’ at this point to ‘ethics’ because I 
think we are not only referring to the ethical ideal of justice. There is a whole 
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set of understandings about what good legal practice implies that we need to 
communicate, and in many different ways, and we don’t need to be too pre-
scriptive about how law schools should do this job. In the common law traditi-
on we do not have a lot of experience but clearly there are many paths that can 
be followed to a more enlightened view of ethics in law, including that of legal 
clinics. Other approaches that are worth mentioning in passing are the applica-
tions of film, literature and storytelling in sensitising lawyers to their ethical 
responsibilities that lie beyond their professional code of conduct.37 But we 
should not forget that it is the legal profession – as much as, if not more than, 
legal and other academics – that has been the driving force behind the move to 
expose law students to legal ethics. 
 If I may I would like briefly to conclude my review of educational devel-
opments with a brief report on the situation in the UK. One perspective that has 
evolved in the UK and may have relevance elsewhere is the “outcomes ap-
proach”i. This approach is politically quite shrewd because it both respects the 
autonomy of the law school yet also enables law teaching to stay in tune with 
current expectations of the profession and indeed, beyond the legal profession, 
with the changing needs of the wider public. And what has happened in the UK 
is that the minimum expectations of the law degree – and looking beyond the 
law degree to both the vocational stage and continuing professional develop-
ment – have now been encapsulated in some very general statements that offer 
guidance as to ends without narrowly proscribing means. There is an “outco-
mes statement” that guides the qualifying law degree but I should like also to 
explain the so-called “Day one requirements” that are being developed by the 
Law Society as part of its controversial Training Framework Review that will 
need to be demonstrated at the point of admission to the solicitors’ side of the 
profession.38  
 
5. New Directions for the Emerging Ethico-Legal Researcher 
 
By way of conclusion I shall highlight two key challenges that confront the 
socio-legal (or ethico-legal) researcher. I wish to suggest that we need to do 
more than describe, explain or evaluate legal professions (or societies) that are 
in transition – we should also aim to influence legal behaviour and conduct, if 
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not directly as law teachers then indirectly as legal scholars and researchers. 
But in order to do this we need, in the words of Franken, ‘a sense of direction’. 
This will require not only a road map but also a sense of adventure and the will 
to travel along the road to justice. It will mean looking further in an outward 
direction but also, in reflective mode, looking inwardly so that we both under-
stand what it is to be a lawyer and, furthermore, in some deeper sense commit 
to our professional values.39  
 The first challenge is the pressing need to engage with theory so that we 
may have a clearer understanding of what constitutes “good lawyering” and 
how it may be achieved and maintained. I particularly welcome the engagement 
with educational theory but we need also to draw upon other fields.40 Empirical 
research on what currently happens in law firms may provide a valid starting 
point but it will not be sufficient. It may be that current practice is not particu-
larly good, and indeed it might even be totally unethical as portrayed in the 
Grisham novel, The Firm.41 The danger I wish to draw attention to is that if all 
we consider is current practice we risk simply reproducing and replicating, if 
not bad lawyering, then perhaps not very good lawyering. Put simply, you don’t 
get an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’. So I think we in the academy need to do further 
research that explores the core values of modern lawyering – the underlying 
determinants of good professional work – in order to identify benchmarks 
against which we can measure what constitutes good lawyering – and I think 
this research also needs to be the result of a sustained, collaborative and inter-
disciplinary effort. Academics cannot do this research in isolation; they need 
support from legal practitioners, other professions and other disciplines.  
 Finally we should also ensure that the ethics of our own community is in 
good shape. Empirical researchers need to be constantly alert to the ethical 
dangers their research may encounter and this will mean investing the time and 
resources to ensure that younger (and more seasoned) researchers understand 
their ethical obligations. The SLSA Ethical Statement points out one way of 
alerting researchers to the presence of ethical dilemmas and conflicts.42 In 
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arguing for a synthesis between ethical and scientific approaches to legal 
conduct, I believe we may draw inspiration from the vision of Justice Cardozo 
who, as far back as 1928, perceived the fundamental values that inform the 
practice of law and legal science: 
 
“The law like science generally, if it could be followed to its roots, would take us 
down beneath the veins and ridges to the unplumbed depths of being, the reality be-
hind the veil. The jurist must not despair because his plummets do not reach the goal 
at which in vein for two thousand years and more the philosophers have been casting 
theirs. Rather he will learn with some of the philosophers themselves in moderating 
his ambitions to recast to some extent his notion of philosophy and to think of it as a 
means for the truer estimate of values and the better ordering of life. He will hope 
indeed that with study and reflection there may develop in the end some form of cal-
culus less precarious than any that philosopher or lawyer has yet been able to devise. 
In the meantime, amid the maze of contingency and regularity, he will content him-
self as best he can with his little compromises and adjustments, the expedients of the 
fleeting hour. They will fret him sometimes with a sense of their uncertainty. It 
should hearten him to keep in mind that uncertainty is the lot of every branch of 
thought and knowledge when verging on the ultimate.”43 
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